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The Relation Between Stock Market Movements
and NYSE Seat Prices
Abstract
Exchange seat prices are widely reported and followed as measures of market sentiment.  This
paper analyzes the information content of NYSE seat prices using:  (1) Annual seat prices
from 1869 to 1998, and (2) The complete record of trades, bids and offers for the seat market
from 1973 to 1994.  Seat market volumes have predictive power regarding future stock market
returns, consistent with a model where seat market activity is a proxy for unobserved factors
affecting expected returns.  We find abnormally large price movements in seats prior to Octo-
ber 1987, consistent with the hypothesis that seat prices capture market sentiment. 
As capital assets whose prices reflect the expectations of the market participants with the
most intimate contact with the trading process, exchange seats are of considerable interest to fi-
nancial economists and practitioners.  Seat prices are widely reported and followed as measures
of market sentiment and health.  Press accounts pay special emphasis to unusually high or low
transaction prices, often implying that seat price changes anticipate overall market movements.1 
Academic research, however, has failed to find such a relation.  Schwert (1977a), in a seminal
study, analyzes monthly seat returns in the period from 1926 to 1972 and shows that seats have
the characteristics of capital assets, but finds no evidence that seat returns predict market returns.
 Seat prices are also of interest because they reflect the impact of competitive and regulatory
factors on security markets (see, e.g., Doede (1967), Schwert (1977b), Stoll (1979), Jarrell
(1984), Chiang, Gay, and Kolb (1987), Ip and Lohse (1998), Bagnoli and Battalio (1996), and
Arnold, Hersch, Mulherin, and Netter (1999)).
This paper examines the information content of transactions and quotes for New York
Stock Exchange (NYSE) seats.  We develop a model that explains how seat market activity is in-
formative about factors affecting overall market returns and examine this hypothesis empirically
using two unique datasets: (1) Annual seat prices from 1869 to 1998, and (2) The complete intra-
daily record of trades, bids and offers for the seat market from 1973 to 1994.
Our analysis yields several new results.  Although exchange seat returns have no predic-
tive power (confirming Schwert’s (1977a) result), seat market activity does capture important in-
formation about future stock market returns.  Specifically, lagged innovations of trading volumes
in the seat market significantly predict the monthly excess returns of the S&P 500 after control-
ling for variables such as the dividend yield and book-to-market ratio that are found to display
predictive power in other studies.  Similar results apply to other measures of seat market liquidity
including changes in the quoted bid-ask spread for seats.  These results are consistent with a
model where seat market liquidity is a proxy for factors − such as future stock market volatility −
affecting expected returns.  We document a permanent (information) component to seat transac-
tions, again consistent with the view that seat trades are regarded as informative. 
Our long-horizon data also provide insights into the value of the exchange franchise over
time.  Although in nominal terms seat prices today are at all-time highs, in real terms they are
roughly at the same level now as they were at the beginning of the century.  Seat prices, however,
exhibit sharp price movements that require further analysis.  Accordingly, we estimate a model of
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monthly seat returns, finding added confirmation for Schwert’s view that seat returns are deter-
mined like those of other capital assets.  We use the model to compute abnormal returns prior to
the Crash of October 1987.  We find large positive abnormal returns to seats in the 12 months
prior to October 1987 followed by large negative abnormal returns, a pattern that closely resem-
bles the Crash of 1929.  These findings are consistent with a behavioral interpretation where
seats (as capital assets that cannot be short sold, are in limited supply, and whose values are tied
to asset price levels) exhibit occasional price bubbles.  In summary, seat transactions are infor-
mative, but the nature of this signal is subtle and complex, reflecting elements of both predictable
risk exposure and occasional market sentiment.
  The paper proceeds as follows:  Section I provides a model of seat prices that guides our
subsequent empirical analyses;  Section II describes our data and relevant institutional details; 
Section III analyzes the return and risk characteristics of seat prices;  Section IV investigates the
information contained in seat price transactions and volume, focusing on the ability of seat mar-
ket variables to predict market returns;  Section V concludes the paper. 
I. Theoretical Considerations
A. A Model of Seat Market Activity
We begin by developing a theoretical model to identify seat market variables that might
be useful in forecasting future stock market returns.  The model’s objective is not only to provide
an explanation for why these variables might have predictive power in an efficient market but
also to reconcile this explanation with the fact (Schwert (1977a)) that seat price movements do
not predict stock market returns.
Seats have value because they provide their owners with future cash flows from their
presence on the floor.2  First consider the set of existing seatholders.  Let C(σt, hit) denote the
cash flow to a floor broker i at the end of period t as a function of a market-wide state variable,
denoted by σt, and its owner’s human capital, hit.  The variables σt and hit are interpreted broadly;
σt is a proxy for market-wide illiquidity or stress (volatility) while hit measures trading skill. 
Higher values of σ imply greater risk and hence higher market returns in the future as compensa-
tion for bearing this risk, as in Merton (1980).3  Human capital takes on one of two values {h1,
h2}, where h1 < h2.  Denote the number of existing seatholders (excluding new entrants) in hu-
man capital class k at time t as Nkt.  Existing brokers transition among states according to a sta-
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.  For example, novice brokers may improve their
trading skills (i.e., h1→ h2) while successful brokers may “burn out” or trade less efficiently (i.e.,
h2 → h1).  Skill levels are relatively stable so  p, q ∈  (½,1).  Barring entry and exit, it is easy to
show that the long-run proportions of brokers in skill categories h1 and h2 are, respectively, (1-
q)/[(1-p)+(1-q)] and (1-p)/[(1-p)+(1-q)].
Higher trading ability enables seatholders to earn more profits, and we model cash flows
as C(σt, hit) = c(σt)hit, where c(σ) is a continuous function of the state.  While we would gener-
ally expect commission revenues to decrease with σ, the function c(σ) need not be monotonic in
σ.  Previous research (Keim and Madhavan (1997)) shows that common stock trades can vary
considerably in degree of difficulty, i.e., in dimensions such as order size and aggressiveness, so
that commission revenue depends on the composition of trading volume.  In states with very low
volatility, market liquidity may be very high and traders can execute relatively large trades with
minimal price impacts.  In this case, the fraction of volume directed to brokers to be “worked” on
the floor, and consequently commission revenues, can be low.  As volatility increases, more dif-
ficult orders may be directed to floor traders, increasing their commission revenue.  For very high
states of volatility, however, volumes may be negligible and commission revenues may fall
sharply.  To allow for such possibilities, we do not impose any a priori restrictions on the func-
tional form of c(σ).
In every period t, the market state variable σt is the realization of an independently and
identically distributed random variable.  The state’s current value is observed by all agents in the
model (although not by the econometrician) but future values are unknown.  For a seatholder
with human capital skills hi (i = 1,2) at time t the expected present value of the cash flows from
seat ownership is
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where r is the discount rate and Πi represents the expected present value of all cash flows from
date t+1 on, where the expectation is taken over possible future realizations of the state and hu-
man capital.  Given the assumed structure of the transition matrix P it is easy to show that Π1 <
Π2.  In other words, since brokers tend to remain in their skill category, the expected future
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earnings of a low skill broker is below that of a high skill broker.  From equation (1), the lowest
reservation price is held by brokers with the least human capital, i.e., v h c rt t1 1
1
11, ( )( )= + +
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Now consider a potential buyer j drawn from a set of J potential risk-neutral entrants. 
Entrants are drawn each period from a pool of potential entrants and do not know their trading
ability prior to entry.  Immediately upon entry at time t, a new seatholder has the lowest skill
level so that hjt = h1.  After one period in the market (in period t+1), an entrant’s true skill level is
revealed according to a stationary probability distribution, and thereafter (periods t+2 etc.) the
entrant is an established seatholder whose abilities evolve according the transition matrix P, as
above.4  We assume the probabilities that a new entrant is of type h1 or h2 are the same as those
for the population as a whole, i.e., (1-q)/[(1-p)+(1-q)] and (1-p)/[(1-p)+(1-q)].  The probability of
the new seatholder being in category h2 in period t+1 is Pr[hjt+1 = h2] = (1-p)/[(1-p)+(1-q)].  Re-
call that the probability of an existing seatholder (not a new entrant) moving from skill level h1 to
h2 in period t+1 is simply 1−p < (1-p)/[(1-p)+(1-q)].  Thus, a new entrant has a better chance of
becoming a skilled broker than an existing broker with a low skill level.
For an entrant, the reservation price at time t is the expected present value of cash flows
less the entry costs to floor trading.  Entry costs consist of the direct costs of establishing a physi-
cal presence on the floor and associated back office costs and, perhaps more importantly, implicit
costs (including the costs of building reputational capital with other floor participants) associated
with floor trading.  Let Ψ(σt) > 0 denote the cost of entry at time t, which we presume is strictly
increasing in σt, the state variable.  This is intuitive since in times of market stress the purchase
of a seat entails greater risk and hence higher financing costs.  Further, the acquisition of reputa-
tional capital may be more difficult when market volatility is high.  Denote by Vj,t the reservation
price of entrant j, so that at time t
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where Πe represents the expected future cash flows.  Note that Π  lies between the high and low
skill state skill levels because the new entrant’s chances of being high skilled exceed those of an
existing low skilled broker.  Under our simplifying assumptions, potential entrants share a com-
mon value at time t, denoted by Vt. 
A.1 Trading and Volume
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Define a function g e( ) ( ) ( )σ σ= − −Π Π Ψ1  that represents the difference between the
valuations of potential entrants and the class of seatholders who place the lowest value on their
seats.  Let σ* be the value of the state variable for which g(σ) = 0, i.e., when outsiders have res-
ervation prices equal to those of the most eager potential sellers.  The function g(σ) is strictly de-
creasing so that for σ > σ* there are no mutually beneficial opportunities for trade.  At the start
of time t, nature selects the state variable σt and this realization is observed by all agents.  One of
two possible states may occur: (1)  If σt > σ* then Vt < v1t, i.e., the reservation price of a potential
buyer is below that of the most eager seller, and no trade occurs, or (2) Conversely, if σt < σ*
then Vt > v1t (under our assumptions v2t > Vt ) and there are mutually advantageous gains from
trade if N1t > 0.  This occurs with positive probability.  Without modeling the exact details of the
bargaining process, we assume that if there are mutually beneficial opportunities for exchange
then trade will occur.  Thus, the volume of trade in period t in the second case is N1t.  It follows
immediately that trading activity in the seat market is inversely related to the expected overall
market volatility.  Merton (1980) shows that higher expected volatility can be associated with a
larger risk premium and hence we would expect an inverse relation between seat market activity
and future returns.
A.2. Other Proxies:  Quoted Spreads  and Returns
Note that the quoted bid-ask spread for seats is also a proxy for the state variable because
it is inversely related to trading activity in the seat market. When σt > σ*, the ask price is set by
competition among potential sellers at v1t while the bid price is determined by competition
among potential buyers at Vt and the average spread is s t e( ) ( ) ( )σ σ= − −Ψ Π Π 1 > 0.  When σt
< σ*, the spread is by definition  zero when buyers and sellers agree on a price to trade.
Seat price returns, however, can provide misleading inferences about changes in the state
variable.  In particular, observe that if a trade occurs, the transaction price, denoted Pt, can be ex-
pressed as P v Vt t t t t= + −α α1 1( )  where αt ∈  (0, 1) captures the ability of buyers to negotiate a
more favorable price.  Seat price movements thus reflect changes in bargaining ability αt (which
may be related to σ in unknown ways) and in the mean valuation ( ) /v Vt t1 2+ .  We do not model
the bargaining process but it is possible that there is a systematic tendency for transactions to oc-
cur at one or the other side of the market based on σ, confounding inferences drawn using seat
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returns.  Even if we can correctly isolate changes in the mean valuation (say using midquote re-
turns), making inferences about changes in σ are problematic because the function c(σ) (which
underlies both valuations) may be non-monotonic.  Thus, an increase in σ need not necessarily
imply a decrease in seat prices, depending on its effect on the composition of volume.  
B. Sentiment
Many market participants have noted the propensity of seat prices to respond in an exag-
gerated manner to market movements (Roeder (1999)), and seat prices are often regarded as
measures of sentiment (McGee (1998)).  Indeed, seats are unique in several respects that are rele-
vant in this context.  As noted by Schwert (1977a) they are capital assets whose values reflect
expectations of future market activity and returns, they are in fixed supply, and they cannot read-
ily be sold short.5 
Recent work in behavioral finance has shown that agents place too much weight on near
term events, especially extreme events.  If this observation applies to the seat market, traders
might be excessively optimistic (pessimistic) about seat cash flows following unexpectedly large
increases (decreases) in stock prices.  In the latter case, however, the prices of seats need not be
biased (relative to a rational forecast) because outsiders can freely buy them from pessimistic
sellers, provided the market also contains large numbers of risk neutral agents with correct ex-
pectations.  In the case of good news this is not the case because seats cannot be sold short. 
This argument suggests an interesting test of whether the seat market reflects sentiment: 
examine the pattern of excess returns to seats relative to a suitable factor model associated with
large stock market increases.  A series of abnormally positive returns would indicate an exagger-
ated reaction to stock market movements that is consistent with the type of behavior posited by
commentators, possibly justifying some of the interest in the seat market. 
II.  Institutions and Data
A. Institutional Details
The New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) is a New York State not-for-profit organization
whose net assets are owned by its seatholders.6  Ownership of a NYSE seat confers full distribu-
tive rights in the NYSE’s net assets, and allows a member access to the NYSE’s trading floor. 
Should the NYSE de-mutualize (i.e., sell shares to the public), seat holders would be residual
claimants to the organization’s assets.  The NYSE was founded in 1792, and seat transactions
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were first allowed in 1869.  There are 1,366 regular members who own seats.7  Seats are indi-
visible, implying that the supply of seats in the last four decades has been fixed.
Seats have value because they entitle their owners to buy and sell securities on the floor,
either as an agent for others or for their own account.  Members can participate in trading in sev-
eral different roles, including:  (1) Specialists, who are exchange-designated market makers, re-
sponsible for providing liquidity and maintaining price continuity in their assigned NYSE-listed
stocks, (2) Commission (house) brokers, who help execute orders for brokerage firms, (3) Inde-
pendent (Two-dollar) brokers who handle the trades of other members, (4) Floor traders, who
trade for their personal accounts, and (5) Registered Competitive Market Makers, who are inde-
pendent floor traders with additional affirmative obligations to provide liquidity.  Specialists and
brokers (house and independent) represent the largest categories on the floor, accounting for 35
percent and 61 percent of total members, respectively.  The member determines how the seat is
used and in this sense, seats are undifferentiated products.  For example, although every special-
ist must own a seat, there is no such thing as a “specialist seat.”  Before 1978 seats could not be
leased to others, but leasing is now relatively common.
Seats are traded in an auction market maintained by the Secretary of the NYSE.  Current
bid and ask quotes are posted in prominent locations on the floor of the exchange, and there are
no transaction costs to purchasing or selling a seat.  In theory, the market for NYSE seats is a
continuous market because transactions or quote changes can be made at any time during the day.
 In practice, however, seats are thinly traded and quotes can remain in effect for several days. 
The seat market is a particularly simple example of a limit order book system, a trading design
that is increasingly common in financial markets.  
Not all transactions take place in the auction market.  Private sales or transfers between
individuals within the same member institution could potentially involve consideration other than
cash and for this reason need not occur at or within the quoted bid and offer prices.  For this rea-
son, we focus only on public seat transactions in cash. 
B. Data Sources and Procedures
B.1 Trade and Quote Data
Our analysis is based on a complete chronological record of all bids, offers, and transac-
tions in the NYSE seat market from January 1973 to July 1994.8  These data are unique in several
important respects.  First, although transactions are infrequent, quotations are available on a daily
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(and occasionally intradaily) basis.  Quotation data are interesting because they can be used to
measure the range of estimates of seat value by market participants.  To our knowledge, these
data have not been examined before.  Second, the data identify the date and time (to the nearest
minute) of all quotes and transactions, allowing us to investigate in more detail the relation be-
tween seat prices and future stock market returns and activity.  Previous studies use prices for
transactions that occur closest to the end of the month.  Such prices present potential problems
because the exact dates of the transactions (or the changes in bids or offers that lead to a transac-
tion) are not observed.  
Third, the data identify the trader behind the quoted bid and ask and the parties to a trans-
action.  This information, together with quotation data, and descriptors such as “X sells to Y” aid
in the identification of trade initiation.  Fourth, the data also provide information on the nature of
the sale.  Most importantly, they identify whether the seat price includes option trading rights and
whether the sale is public or is a private sale or transfer.  This information helps us identify and
exclude trades (e.g., private sales or transfers) taking place at non-market prices.  Finally, the pe-
riod from 1973 to 1994 is of particular interest as it covers several events that pertain to the com-
petitive position of the NYSE and the profitability of the brokerage industry.  These events in-
clude the elimination of fixed commissions in May 1975, the introduction of the DOT electronic
trading system in March 1976,  the introduction of the Intermarket Trading System (ITS) in April
1978, and the Crash of October 1987. 
The data are obtained from the NYSE in the form of a hand-written ledger and are then
transcribed by hand to electronic form.9  Several filters are used to ensure the accuracy of the
data.  First, we screen the data for obvious outliers and other keypunch errors such as dropped
digits.  Second, we cross-check the transaction prices against reported prices available through
other sources (e.g., the NYSE Fact Book).  Finally, we take care to ensure that sequences of
transaction prices are comparable by excluding private sales and transfers, and by correcting for
the effect of option trading rights which can be traded separately. 
To illustrate the nature of the data, consider Table I.  The table shows the quotation rec-
ord from Monday, July 21 to Wednesday, July 23, 1986, with only the first initial of the partici-
pants’ last names used to preserve anonymity.  At the open of the auction market at 9:00 on
Monday, the bid and ask prices were $505,000 and $600,000 (based on quotes by S and W), re-
spectively.  These quotes remained in effect through the open on Tuesday.  At 11:15, an outside
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investor, T who was not previously represented on either the bid or ask side, hit the quoted bid
and sold to S at the bid price of $505,000.  With S out of the market, the best bid was represented
by G for $410,000.  This bidder then improved the bid to $430,000 at 13:00, and at 13:30 on
Tuesday, a new player L entered the market and posted an ask price of $550,000. At 14:20, a new
bidder B entered with a bid of $435,000. These quotes remained in effect until 10:40 on
Wednesday, when yet another new player A improved the bid further to $450,000.  This offer
was quickly countered by B, who improved the bid to $460,000.  These quotes remained in effect
for the rest of the week. 
This example serves to illustrate several aspects of the data.  First, quotes narrow in re-
sponse to new trading interest as shown by the quote records for Wednesday, July 23. Second,
although the trade shown here is seller-initiated, traders often adjust their quotes to signal their
willingness to trade.  This is illustrated by the quote record for 13:00 on Tuesday, July 22, when
G voluntarily raises his bid price from $410,000 to $430,000, possibly to indicate an active inter-
est in trading.  The variability of the quoted bid-ask spread makes it difficult to use this measure
as a proxy for seat market liquidity.  Third, the transaction in this example is viewed as informa-
tive in the sense it has a permanent effect on the seat price level.  Indeed, the price change from
the pre-trade midquote to the opening midquote the day after the seat sale is −10.8 percent.
Most days feature less activity.  Overall, there are 686 trades in the sample period, im-
plying a trading frequency of just 0.20 per business day. In contrast, the quotation frequency is
much higher with an average of two quotations per business day over the entire period. Both
trading and quotation frequencies are higher in the 1973 to 1980 period which includes events
such as the elimination of fixed commissions, the oil crisis, and a major recession.  Of particular
interest, the mean percentage pre-trade bid-ask spread is large, 22.54 percent.
B.2. Annual Data
We obtain from the NYSE an annual series of seat prices covering the period from 1869,
when trading in seats commenced, through year-end 1998.  The long-horizon data provide a use-
ful historical perspective that helps place our more detailed transaction-level analyses in context.
 However, the annual series includes high and low seat prices in each year, and the non-
synchronous nature of the data warrant some caution when interpreting the results.  As noted by
Working (1960) and Schwert (1990), averaging high and low prices within the year produces
time series characteristics that are similar to those that result when time-averaging data that come
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from a random walk.  The returns from such a series resemble a first-order moving average with
correspondingly high first-order autocorrelation and understated standard deviations.  Schwert
(1990) employs a procedure to correct for this effect when he constructs a market return series
(that we use below) based on the Cowles Index (which averages high and low prices). The sum-
mary statistics that we report below reflect this correction.
III.  Risk and Return Characteristics of Exchange Seats
A. Seats as Capital Assets
We begin by examining the risk and return characteristics of seats, viewing them as capi-
tal assets.  The mean annual return (standard deviation) for the 1869 to 1998 period is 8.07 per-
cent (28.1 percent) for exchange seats and 10.73 percent (18.45 percent) for the entire market.10 
Similar results hold for monthly data in the period from 1973 to 1994.11   These aggregate figures
conceal considerable variation over time, necessitating a more formal analysis of the relation
between risk and return for exchange seats.  We use a model first proposed by Schwert (1977a)
for this purpose. 
We extend Schwert’s original analysis in two ways: (1) We update the sample period us-
ing detailed transaction-level data from 1973 to 1994; and (2) We include additional independent
variables in the model to control for other factors affecting seat returns.  To capture the influence
of trade activity, we include the log monthly change in composite NYSE volume. Fama and
French (1993) argue that two additional factors are useful to capture the nondiversifiable risk of
an asset.  They find that a size-related and a value/growth-related factor are helpful in describing
asset return variation.  We therefore include those two factors in our model. 
We estimate the following regression model:
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where Rt is the return on NYSE seats in month t, rf,t is the treasury bill rate, rm,t is the return on a
value-weighted market index, SMBt is a monthly size premium (small stock return - large stock
return), HMLt is a monthly book/market premium (high B/M return - low B/M return), VOLt is
the (logarithmic) growth in the aggregate NYSE share volume from month t-1 to month t, and εt
is the error term.  The first three factors are those used by Fama and French (1993).12 
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The results for the entire sample and two subperiods for k=1 are summarized in Table II. 
Results for other lags are similar and are not reported here.  For the entire period, contemporane-
ous excess market returns are positive (p-value = 0.06), but well below one, indicating that seat
prices respond to market information, albeit slowly.  The sensitivity of seat prices to market
movements appears to have increased over the sample period; in the post-1984 period the coeffi-
cient on the market return is 0.55 and statistically significant at the 5 percent level.  The two
factors used by Fama and French (1993) vary in their significance across the subperiods.  The co-
efficient on the size premium is significant in the entire period and in the pre-1985 period but not
in the most recent subperiod.  This factor, which has been shown to have a significant effect on
stock returns, thus also affects seat returns perhaps reflecting the illiquid nature of both the mar-
ket for seats and for small-cap stocks in the earlier sample.  The lagged value of this variable also
follows a similar pattern, but the value-growth factor has little explanatory power.  Finally, there
is a significant relation between monthly seat price changes and contemporaneous monthly
NYSE volume changes in the overall period, but lagged volume has little explanatory power.
IV.  Predictability of Returns
A. Return Predictability Using Monthly Data
Our model suggests that variables associated with seat market liquidity (transaction fre-
quency and the bid-ask spread) are related to expectations about future market volatility.  Merton
(1980) shows that the equilibrium expected return for the market is an increasing function of the
risk of the market, and argues that models of the market risk premium must account for changes
in the level of market risk.  He goes on to suggest that the model can be improved by inclusion of
additional non-market instruments for market risk, such as surveys of investor expectations.  Seat
market activity represents a market-determined observation on such expectations, and we expect
changes in lagged seat activity to, likewise, have predictive power.
A.1. Correlations Among Seat Market Variables
As a convenient way of summarizing the relation between seat market variables and mar-
ket returns and volatility, we show in Table III the matrix of estimated Pearson correlation coef-
ficients among the variables.  A correlation coefficient ρ whose absolute value is statistically sig-
nificant under the null hypothesis H0: ρ = 0  is indicated with an asterisk.  The variables of inter-
est are (for month t) the current and next month’s excess return on the S&P 500 index, market
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volatility (measured by the absolute excess return of the S&P 500 index), the excess return on
seats, the average bid-ask spread (expressed as a percentage of the midquote price) in the seat
market, the number of transactions (volume) in the seat market, and the signed order flow in the
seat market.  We define order flow as X zt i ti
Nt=
=∑ ,1  where zi,t is a trade-initiation variable for
trade i in month t (z = +1 for a buyer-initiated trade, z = −1 for a seller initiated trade, and z = 0
for a trade at the midquote). 
The results in Table III are interesting in several respects.  First, observe that the only
variable that is significantly correlated with future stock market excess returns is the volume of
seat trades.  This correlation is negative and significant at the 5 percent level, consistent with the
prediction of our model. Trading activity in the seat market is also negatively related to current
stock market returns and this correlation is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  Trad-
ing activity is also positively and significantly correlated with overall market volatility, again the
only variable to do so in a significant manner.13  Second, although seat returns are correlated with
contemporaneous market returns, over the period from 1973 to 1994 the correlation with future
stock market returns is not significantly different from zero.  This is consistent with Schwert
(1977a) for the period ending in 1973.  Third, the order flow variable is positively and signifi-
cantly correlated with contemporaneous stock market returns.  Since there are entry costs, the de-
cision to trade a seat is likely to have been made some time prior to the actual trade, so that this
result suggests that seat order flow is related to signals about future stock market movements. 
Seat market returns are positively and significantly correlated with contemporaneous signed or-
der flow in the seat market, consistent with Table I where trade initiation affects the seat price
level.  Fourth, trading activity in the seat market is also negatively related to current stock market
returns and this correlation is statistically significant at the 10 percent level.  Finally, as we would
expect, seat volumes are negatively and significantly related to the contemporaneous seat bid-ask
spread.   We turn now to a more formal investigation of the predictive power of seat market vari-
ables.
A.2. Regression Models
Recent research finds similar patterns of predictability in stock returns. For example,
Fama and Schwert (1977), Campbell (1987) and Keim and Stambaugh (1986) use ex ante ob-
servable market variables that capture the level of treasury bill yields, asset prices, default pre-
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mium, and the term structure slope to predict monthly stock and bond returns.  Fama and French
(1988) and Harvey (1991) use the dividend yield for the U.S. equity market to predict stock re-
turns domestically and internationally, respectively.  Kothari and Shanken (1997) and Pontiff and
Schall (1998) use the book-to-market ratio for the overall market to predict stock returns.
Our model suggests that liquidity in the seat market may proxy for unobserved factors af-
fecting expected returns.  Seat market liquidity (as measured by volume) is likely to be autocor-
related so we focus on the innovation in the liquidity variable.  In addition to lagged seat market
volumes, we also include as controls the seat price level (a proxy for entry barriers), the change
in the seat bid-ask spread (a proxy for transactions costs), and the lagged absolute seat return (a
proxy for risk).  We model transaction activity as:
N N LogPrice DSPD AbsRett i t i
i
t t t t= + + + + +−
=
− − −∑β β λ λ λ ε0
1
6
1 1 2 1 3 1 (4)
where, in month t, Nt is the number of public trades in the seat market,  LogPricet is the (log)
transaction price in the seat market (midquote if there was no trade), DSPDt is the change in the
month-end quoted bid-ask spread for exchange seats, AbsRett is the absolute seat return, and εt is
an error term.  The model fits well (the results are not reported here) and adjusted R2 is 0.381. 
As expected volume is strongly autocorrelated at short lags, and volume is negatively and signifi-
cantly related to the price level and the increase in spreads.  The absolute seat return in the previ-
ous month is not significant.  
We then estimate the following regression model for the period from 1973 to 1994
r r r r LIQ BM DEF
TERM TBYLD DIV
m t f t m t f t i t i
i
t t
t t t t
, , , ,( )− = + − + + + +
+ + +
− − −
=
− −
− − −
∑α β γ δ δ
δ δ δ ε
1 1
1
3
1 1 2 1
3 1 4 1 5 1
(5)
where, in month t: rm,t is the return on the S&P 500 index, rf,t is the return on treasury bills; LIQt
is the innovation in liquidity, defined as the estimated residuals from the regression estimates of
Nt in equation (4), BMt is the Dow Jones book-to-market ratio; DEFt  is the low-grade bond de-
fault yield premium; TERMt  is the average yield of Treasury bonds with more than  ten years to
maturity minus the yield of T-bills that mature in  three months;  TBYLDt  is the yield of a T-bill
that matures in three months; and DIVt  is the annual dividend yield of  the CRSP value-weighted
index measured monthly, as described in Fama and French (1988).  The last five variables are
from Pontiff and Schall (1998) who describe their construction in more detail.14  Our model sug-
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gests a negative relation between market excess returns and lagged liquidity measures.  We em-
ploy several lagged values of liquidity because we have no strong priors on the intensity of the
forward-looking expectations implied in seat volumes. 
A.3. Results
Table IV reports estimates of the coefficients for the 1973 to 1994 period and for two
subperiods.  We find evidence − consistent with Table III above − that lagged volume innova-
tions have predictive power for future excess market returns.  For the period as a whole, the coef-
ficients on the volume innovations, γ1, γ2 and γ3 are all negative and significant at the 5 percent
level.  The observed relation is consistent with an increase in the expected risk premium follow-
ing an increase in perceived volatility, manifested by less activity in the seat market (Merton
(1980)). Given that empirical evidence for Merton’s model is mixed, there may be other expla-
nations for this result.  For example, liquidity in the seat market might be positively related to
overall market liquidity, and hence higher asset values and lower expected returns as in Amihud
and Mendelson (1986) and Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (1998).  The coefficient estimates
and significance levels for the five additional variables are comparable to those reported by Pon-
tiff and Schall (1998) for the 1959 to 1994 period (see their Table 3, Panel B). 
We performed several robustness checks of these results.  Interestingly, the exclusion of
the additional ex ante observable variables does not materially impact the estimated coefficients,
or the significance, of the seat variables.   The results are also relatively insensitive to the specifi-
cation of equation (4).  In both sub-periods (January 1973 to December 1984 and January 1985 to
July 1994), the coefficients γ1, γ2 and γ3 on the liquidity measures are negative, but significance
levels vary, possibly a result of lack of power.  In the most recent period, γ1 is negative and sig-
nificant at the 5 percent level, and in the older period, both γ2 and γ3 are negative and significant
at the 10 percent level.  By contrast, the significance (and sometimes the sign) of the predeter-
mined observable variables varies in the subperiods.
A.4. Other Variables:  Spreads and Seat Returns
The model suggests that other proxies for seat market liquidity such as the bid-ask spread
for seats are positively related to future stock market returns.  We replicate the analysis above
using the bid-ask spread immediately preceding the last trade of the month as our (inverse)
measure of liquidity.  Although we find that the hypothesized relation does hold, significance
levels vary and are sensitive to the definition of the spread.  This may reflect the difficulty in
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measuring true or effective spreads.  As the example in Table I shows, negotiation through suc-
cessive quote revisions makes the definition of the average monthly spread problematic.  Further,
there can be large differences between the mean spread, median spread, beginning spread, ending
spread, and pre-trade bid-ask spread in a given month.  By contrast, the definition of seat market
volume is unambiguous and is unlikely to be measured with error.
The only previous study of seat return dynamics (Schwert (1977a)) failed to detect any
predictability in returns using seat prices in the period from 1926 to 1972.  It is interesting to see
if these findings hold true in our long and short-horizon data.  However, using the same approach
as above, we fail to demonstrate any evidence of predictability at the monthly level.  Similar re-
sults are obtained using annual data from 1869 to 1998. Finally, we also estimate regressions us-
ing monthly data where the dependent variable is volume growth and independent variables are
lagged values of volume innovations, seat returns, market returns, and other predicting variables.
These findings confirm Schwert’s original results with different data.  As our model demon-
strates, the failure to find predictability using seat returns is not especially surprising because seat
returns need not be related to expectations of overall stock market volatility in a monotonic way.
Indeed, as Table III shows, although trading frequency and volatility are significantly and posi-
tively correlated, seat returns exhibit negative but insignificant correlation.
B. Transaction-Level Analysis 
Our transaction-level data allow us to ask whether seat transactions are perceived as hav-
ing information content.  This question is interesting because it might explain why order flow is
significantly and positively correlated with contemporaneous stock market returns, as in Table
III, providing an additional reason for why seat market transactions might be informative.  Ac-
cordingly, we compute the permanent and temporary price movements associated with seat trans-
actions.  These definitions are common in the block trading literature.  Following Keim and
Madhavan (1996) we define the permanent (information-based) and temporary (liquidity-based)
impacts as, respectively:
PERM P P
TEMP P P
PRE POST
POST
= −
= −
ln( ) ln( )
ln( ) ln( )
(6)
where PPRE  is the midquote prevailing immediately before the trade, PPOST  is the average of the
bid and ask price prevailing just before the subsequent trade, and P is the trade price itself.  The
permanent impact captures the long-run change in asset values as a result of a trade while the
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temporary (liquidity-based) component is interpreted as the price movement necessary to com-
pensate the liquidity provider for accommodating the initiator's desire for immediacy.  The per-
centage price impact of the trade is the sum of the permanent and temporary impacts.  Our de-
tailed transaction level data allows us to compute these measures for buys and sells.
These measures presume that the pre-trade reference price is an accurate assessment of
the asset's underlying value or “unperturbed” price prior to the transaction.  For a thinly traded
asset such as an exchange seat, the pre-trade price might be a biased measure of this value if bid
and offer quotes are stale.  For example, consider a sell trade following a decline in the overall
stock market.  If the quotes are stale, the reference (pre-trade) price will be too high, and the
permanent impact will be overstated.  Although stale quotes represent a potentially serious prob-
lem, note that most transactions occur on days where there have been several quote revisions. 
Indeed, there are approximately three quote revisions just prior to a trade. Nevertheless, as a ro-
bustness check, we compute the percentage movement in the S&P 500 from the time of the pre-
vious trade to the current trade for buys and sells.
We estimate the two components of trade impact separately for the 344 buys and 286
sells in our sample, excluding 55 uncategorized transactions.  The average permanent impact for
buys is 2.55 percent and for sells is −2.43 percent, and both are statistically significant.  Interest-
ingly, buy (sell) trades are associated with positive (negative) S&P 500 movements, but these
changes (0.82 percent for buys and −0.38 percent for sells) are not large compared to the impacts.
 Thus, even though there is a tendency for trade-initiation to be correlated with market move-
ments, the transaction price is still permanently revised in the direction of trade initiation.  This is
consistent with there being information content to trade initiation, possibly because some brokers
have information about their own order flows and hence private signals regarding future trading
activity. 
The estimates of the temporary component are also economically significant, but are
smaller in magnitude.   Temporary impacts are higher for sells (−2.24 percent) than buys (1.47
percent).  The reason for this asymmetry is unclear.  It is possible that sells occur more often in
downward markets when the brokerage sector is distressed and potential buyers can extract
greater rents from sellers.  There are no systematic patterns in the permanent or temporary im-
pacts for unclassified trades.  In summary, the fact that seat price movements contain a perma-
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nent price component indicates that market participants revise their beliefs in response to trades,
i.e., trades are perceived to contain information about future asset values.  
C. Seat Prices and Market Sentiment
C.1. Historical Seat Prices: 1869 to 1998
Although seats behave as capital assets there are times when seat prices react in exagger-
ated ways to news events.  Since seats are in limited supply and cannot easily be short sold, we
are more likely to observe a bubble in these assets.  Such bubbles, if they exist, may presage or
occur contemporaneously with bubbles in other assets, including financial assets.  It is perhaps
for this reason that seat prices − like the prices of art objects − are often regarded as indicators of
market sentiment. 
While this argument is plausible, empirical tests are difficult to construct because of the
isolated nature of such events.  Nonetheless, some insights can be gained by studying the past
history of seat prices.  Figure 1 plots an annual nominal and real seat price index (with 1869=1)
over the entire period from 1869 to 1998 during which seats were traded.15  The nominal series
exhibits three significant price run-ups – with peaks in 1929, 1969, and 1987 – that were quickly
followed by declines of comparable magnitudes. 
In real terms, however, even the recent highs in seat prices pale in comparison to past seat
prices.  Figure 1 also shows an inflation-adjusted seat price index series.16  The real series is
dominated by the 1929 observation, which is on the order of three times the magnitude of the
next highest observation in 1969.  In comparison, the 1987 and 1998 observations appear small,
lower even than the observations at the beginning of the century.  So in real terms, the capitalized
value of the floor trading franchise is at approximately the same level that prevailed at the begin-
ning of the century.  These findings are consistent with an asset price bubble in the seat market
that paralleled the extreme valuations in the stock market in 1929.  We turn now to a more de-
tailed investigation of  seat price behavior in 1987 using the transaction level data.
C.2. Seat Prices in October 1987 
Seat prices reached a record high just before the crash of October 19, 1987, much as they
had just prior to the 1929 crash.  To examine whether seat returns prior to the crash are in some
sense abnormally large, perhaps indicative of over-optimism, we examine the returns to NYSE
seats relative to the expected seat returns.  Let ARt denote the abnormal return in month t, defined
as the residual in equation (3), and let CARt denote the standardized cumulative abnormal return.
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Figure 2 plots CARt over the period from January 2, 1986 to December 31, 1988.  There is a large
and statistically significant increase in the cumulative abnormal returns prior to the crash, fol-
lowed by negative abnormal returns during the nine-month post-crash period.  By October 1988
the cumulative abnormal returns are essentially zero. 
The abnormal increase in seat prices in the 12 months prior to the crash is consistent with
an exaggerated and speculative response to expected market movements by market participants. 
 It is interesting to note that the stock market highs in 1999 are accompanied by (prior to discus-
sions of demutualization of the NYSE in mid-1999) the highest recorded price for a NYSE seat
of $2.6 million on March 1, 1999.  Perhaps for these reasons, seat prices are regarded as meas-
ures of market sentiment.
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V.  Conclusions
Stock exchange seats are capital assets whose prices reflect the expectations of market
professionals regarding future activity in the equity market as a whole.  For this reason, there is
considerable interest in seat transactions and prices by both practitioners and academicians.  But
what information, if any, is provided by transactions and quotes for stock exchange seats?  This
paper examines this question using:  (1) Annual prices of NYSE seats over the entire history of
trading from 1869 to 1998, and (2) The complete record of all bids, offers, and trades in the
NYSE seat market from 1973 to 1994.
Our analysis yields several new results.  Like Schwert (1977a), there is no evidence that
seat returns can forecast future market volatility, volume, or stock market returns.  However,
lagged innovations in seat market activity are useful in predicting the monthly excess returns of
the S&P500.  This is consistent with a model where an increase in seat market activity (liquidity)
is associated with less volatility and hence (Merton, 1980) a lower expected risk premium.
Given that empirical evidence for Merton’s model is mixed (Scruggs, 1998), it is worth
noting that there may be other explanations for our findings.  For example, liquidity in the seat
market might be positively related to overall market liquidity, implying (Amihud and Mendelson,
1986) lower expected returns.  It is worth emphasizing that seat variables are not a proxy for
other variables (e.g., dividend yields, default premia, book/market ratios) that have been found to
display predictive power. 
We find additional confirmation for the view that market participants regard seat trades as
informative in that seat transactions contain a significant permanent (information) component. 
Seat returns are determined like those of other capital assets.  However, there is some evidence
consistent with seat prices serving as measures of sentiment.  Specifically, we document abnor-
mally large run-ups in seat prices prior to October 1987 (similar to those prior to the Crash of
1929) that are subsequently reversed, consistent with an asset price bubble. 
In conclusion, seat prices do indeed contain important information about the beliefs of
traders regarding future stock market activity, but that this information is subtle and complex in
nature.
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Table I
Sample Chronological Record of Bids, Offers, and Trades in the NYSE Seat Market
The table reports sample quotation records for the NYSE seat market (using data obtained from the NYSE) for Monday, July 21, to
Wednesday, July 23, 1986.  Each record shows the prevailing bid, offer, or trade price (with the identities of the traders A, B, G, L, T, W,
and S) at the time of the transaction or change in quotes.  The symbol  → indicates the direction of a transaction.  All prices are in thou-
sands of dollars.
Bid Offer Transaction
Date Time Price Identity Price Identity Price Type
Monday, 7/21/86 Open $505 S $600 W
Tuesday, 7/22/86 Open 505 S 600 W
11:15 505 Sell (T → S)
12:00 410 G 600 W
13:00 430 G 600 W
13:30 430 G 550 L
14:25 435 B 550 L
Wednesday, 7/23/86 Open 435 B 550 L
10:40 450 A 550 L
12:19 460 B 550 L
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Table II
Return and Risk of NYSE Seats Using Monthly Data 1973-1994
The table presents estimates of the regression model:
R r r r SMB HML VOLt f t i m t i f t i
i
k
i t i
i
k
i t i
i
k
i t i
i
k
t− = + − + + + +− −
=
−
=
−
=
−
=
∑ ∑ ∑ ∑, , ,( )α β γ δ φ ε
0 0 0 0
for the period 1973-1994 and for two subperiods, where Rt is the return on NYSE seats in month t, rft is the treasury bill rate, rm,t is the
total return on the S&P 500 index, SMBt is a monthly size premium (small stock return − large stock return), HMLt is a monthly
book/market premium (high B/M return − low B/M return), VOLt is the growth in the aggregate NYSE share volume from month t-1 to
month t, and εt is the error term.   The first three factors are those used by Fama and French (1993).  Results are presented for one lag
(k=1) of all variables but are similar for higher lag structures.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Estimated Regression Parameters (Standard Errors)
Period Intercept r rm t f t, ,− r rm t f t, ,− −−1 1 SMBt SMBt-1 HMLt HMLt-1 VOLt VOLt-1 Adj R
2    
{No. Obs}
1/73-7/94 0.004
(0.008)
0.372*
(0.199)
0.286
(0.202)
0.918**
(0.299) 
0.470*
(0.281)
−0.011
(0.347)
−0.152
(0.340)
0.103**
(0.052)
0.068
(0.053)
0.133
{231}
1/85-7/94 0.002
(0.010)
0.548**
(0.251)
0.313
(0.265)
0.675
(0.453)
−0.160
(0.423)
0.957*
(0.507)
−0.940*
(0.499)
0.100
(0.073)
0.124
(0.075)
0.139
{114}
1/73-12/84 −0.001
(0.014)
0.312
(0.336)
0.199
(0.332)
1.556**
(0.434)
0.793*
(0.416)
−0.452
(0.510)
0.164
(0.492)
0.107
(0.080)
0.028
(0.079)
0.141
{116}
      * denotes significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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Table III
Correlation Matrix Using Monthly Data 1973-1994
The table displays estimated Pearson correlation coefficients using monthly data for the period from January 1973 to July 1994.  The
variables are defined (for month t) as follows:  rm,t − rf,t is the return on the S&P 500 index less the return on treasury bills; Rt−rft is the
excess return on seats, St is defined as the average bid-ask spread (expressed as a percentage of the midquote price) for seats, Nt is the
number of transaction (volume) in the seat market, and X zt i ti
Nt=
=∑ ,1 is the total signed volume in the seat market, where zi,t is a trade-
initiation variable for trade i in month t (z = +1 for a buyer-initiated trade, z = −1 for a seller initiated trade, and z = 0 for a trade at the
midquote.  Tests of significance are based on a difference in absolute value from zero.
r rm t f t, ,+ +−1 1 r rm t f t, ,− | |, ,r rm t f t− R rt f t− , St Nt Xt
r rm t f t, ,+ +−1 1 −0.011 −0.057 −0.001   0.034  −0.135** −0.049  
r rm t f t, ,− −0.036   0.216** −0.015  −0.117*   0.286**
| |, ,r rm t f t−  −0.031   0.021    0.178** −0.007
R rt f t− ,   0.162**    0.099   0.544**
St  −0.205**   0.034
Nt   0.056
Xt
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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Table IV
Predictability of Stock Market Returns Using Monthly Data 1973-1994
The table presents estimates of the regression model for the period 1973-1994 and for two ten-year subperiods:
r r r LIQ BM DEF TERM TBYLD DIVm t m t f t i t i
i
t t t t t t, , ,( )= + − + + + + + + +− − −
=
− − − − −∑α β γ δ δ δ δ δ ε1 1
1
3
1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1
where, for month t: rm,t − rf,t is the return on the S&P 500 index less the return on treasury bills; LIQt is defined as the residual from a re-
gression of seat volumes on lagged volumes and other explanatory variables (×10-2), BMt is the Dow Jones book-to-market ratio; DEFt  is
the low-grade bond default yield premium; TERMt  is the average yield of Treasury bonds with more than  ten years to maturity minus the
yield of T-bills that mature in  three months; TBYLDt  is the yield of a T-bill that matures  in three months; and   DIVt  is the annual divi-
dend yield of  the CRSP value-weighted index measured monthly, as described in  Fama and French (1988). The last five variables are
from Pontiff  and Schall (1998) who describe their construction in more detail.  Standard errors are in parentheses.
Estimated Regression Parameters (Standard Errors)
Period Intercept r rm t f t, ,− −−1 1 LIQt-1 LIQt-2 LIQt-3 BMt-1 DEFt-1 TERMt-1 TBYLDt-1 DIVt-1 Adj. R
2  
{No. Obs}
1/73-7/94 −0.085**
(0.023)
−0.079
(0.066)
−0.287**
(0.143)
−0.309**
(0.142)
−0.309**
(0.141)
−13.570**
(3.126)
 2.833**
(1.054)  
−0.301
(0.335)
−0.997**
(0.241) 
5.917**
(1.124)   
0.155
{223}
1/85-7/94 −0.026
(0.050)
0.018
(0.103)
−0.593**
(0.291) 
−0.084  
(0.282)
−0.309  
(0.141)
 20.989**
(9.469) 
−1.260  
(2.847)
−3.177**
(0.915)
−3.719**
  (0.824)  
7.391**
(2.232)   
0.157
{111}
1/73-12/84 −0.096**
(0.034)
−0.168*
(0.096)
−0.179
(0.185)
−0.307*
(0.182)
−0.358*
(0.183)
−17.529  
(11.322)
 3.549**
(1.283)  
−0.637
(0.612)
−0.953**
(0.332)
6.751**
(2.668)   
0.215
{108}
* denotes significance at the 10 percent level; ** denotes significance at the 5 percent level.
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Legend for Figure 1:
The figure shows average annual real and nominal seat prices in the period from the start of ex-
change seat trading in 1869 until discussions of demutualization in 1998.  Prices are normalized
to equal one in 1869.
Legend for Figure 2:
This graph shows the cumulative standardized abnormal returns to NYSE seats in the period
from January 1986 to December 1988 surrounding the Crash of October 1987.  Abnormal returns
are computed as the residuals from the model of seat excess returns estimated in Table II.
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Notes
1 Roeder (1999) observes “There’s is a new kind of bull market at the Chicago Stock Exchange
and, if history is a guide, it might serve as a warning for investors…Only twice has the value of a
Chicago Stock Exchange membership exceeded $100,000.  Both occurrences came weeks before
the two worst crashes in stock market history − in the Octobers of 1929 and 1987.”  Similarly,
the Los Angeles Times of May 22, 1998 (Section D, Page 4) notes that “the price for a seat on the
New York Stock Exchange fell Thursday for the third time in a row−the first time that has hap-
pened in seven years−but brokers said the drop was a fallout from the NYSE’s recent trading
scandal, not an early warning that the stock market is about to dive.” (Emphasis added.) McGee
(1998) discusses seat prices as measures of sentiment.
2 As the NYSE notes, “Prices are based on the interplay of supply and demand and reflect the
profitability of the brokerage business, the level of trading volume on the Exchange, general eco-
nomic conditions, and other factors.”
3 Alternatively, we could interpret σ  as an inverse proxy for an overall stock market liquidity
factor.  A decrease in expected liquidity increases the transactions costs of traders who in turn
demand a higher risk premium.
4 For simplicity, we assume a new entrant does not sell his/her seat until his/her type is revealed.
5 In theory, since seats can be leased, a synthetic short could be constructed.  However, in prac-
tice this appears difficult given the nature of leasing relationships, as discussed in Section II be-
low.
6 Seat and NYSE membership are synonymous because until 1871 members sat in assigned
chairs during the roll call of stocks.
7 Originally, there were 1,060 seats but this number was increased to 1,375 in 1932 and finally to
the present number of 1,366 in 1953.  In addition, there are a small number of “partial” member-
ships that convey limited physical or electronic access to the floor for a basic fee supplemented
by annual fees.
8 We thank Steve Fuller of the NYSE for providing access to these data.
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9 Due to omissions in the data obtained from the NYSE, we are missing quote and price infor-
mation for two blocks of time: January 1980 to December 1980 and May 1983 to October 1983.
10 Market returns are measured using a value-weighted index of NYSE stocks constructed by
Schwert (1990) for the 1870 to 1925 period and by CRSP for the 1926 to 1998 period.
11 By July 1994, the value of a $1 seat investment was $4.36 versus $9.55 for the S&P 500 index.
 Seats also exhibited considerably more volatility – the standard deviation of monthly seat returns
over the 1973 to 1994 period of 12.41 percent versus 4.59 percent for the S&P 500  return.
12 We thank Gene Fama and Ken French for generously providing these data.
13  See Schwert (1989) for a discussion of time variation in volatility.
14  We thank Jeff Pontiff and Larry Schall for generously providing these data.
15 We do not “split-adjust” the seat prices for the increase in the number of seats in 1932 and
1952 because we view these events as analogous to a secondary equity issue rather than a straight
dilution of existing equity.  Since the magnitude of the increases are relatively small, however,
our conclusions are unaffected by such an adjustment.
16  We thank Jeremy Siegel for providing us with the data.  See Siegel (1992) for further details.
